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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 
~
vs
" 14531 
DOUGLAS REX YOUNG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated 
robbery in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury of 
the crime of aggravated burglary, a violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-203 (1973 as amended). Following his conviction, 
appellant was sentenced to the indeterminate term of five 
years to life in the Utah State Prison, where he is presently 
incarcerated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Pvespondent seeks the affirmation of the verdict 
and judgment of the court below, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 12:30 p.m. on November 13, 1975, Mr. John 
Snyder, manager of an apartment building, and his wife had 
just returned home. Upon entering the apartment building 
they passed a man in the hallway who was a stranger to 
them and who was later identified as appellant (T.24,25). 
After entering their apartment, which is on the top 
floor of the building, Mr. Snyder immediately went out on 
his balcony (T.25) because he was suspicious of the 
stranger being in the building (T.38). While on the 
balcony, he heard a jaring noise coming from the balcony 
area of apartment number three, belonging to Miss Ross 
(T.26). 
Mr. Snyder instructed his wife to call the 
police (T.26). He then left his apartment, ran out 
of the building and around to the patio area of apartment 
number three. Through the closed sliding glass door that 
separates the patio area from the interior of the apart-
ment Mr. Snyder observed a man, whom he identified to 
be the appellant, dash out of a bedroom inside the 
apartment: (T.27). The man jumped up on the kitchen 
counter and tried, with no success, to open a window 
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on the opposite side of the apartment (T.28). Mr. 
Snyder then ran around to the front of the building, 
looked through the window and observed an empty-
apartment • He ran to the front of another building 
and observed the appellant running west down an 
alleyway. Mr. Snyder pursued him across two lawns, 
an alleyway and down a driveway and then overtook and 
subdued him (T.30). 
Without striking appellant, Mr. Snyder forced 
appellant's arms behind his back and escorted him to 
the front lawn of Mr. Snyder's apartment building (T.31). 
Mr. Snyder testified that in order to keep the appellant 
from leaving before the police arrived (T.47) he 
instructed appellant to lay on the lawn. When appellant 
refused to do so Mr. Snyder forced him to his knees 
bY applying pressure on his arms.(T.32). According 
to Mr. Snyder, at no time did he try to force appellant's 
face into canine excrement which was on the grass (T.48). 
Mrs. Snyder then came out of the apartment 
building and said she had called the police. At this 
point appellant struggled with Mr. Snyder, freed himself 
and in the scuffle he punched Mr. Snyder in the face, 
breaking his nose (T.50). Mrs. Snyder then grabbed 
appellant's hand and realized that appellant had drawn 
a knife from his jacket; appellant then freed himself 
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from Mrs. Snyder. After threatening Mr. Snyder to stay 
away or he'd kill him (T.34), appellant ran across 
the street and drove away, but not before Mr. Snyder 
was able to obtain the vehicle license number. Appellant 
was subsequently arrested and charged with aggravated 
burglary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT DOES FALL WITHIN 
CONDUCT SOUGHT TO BE PROSCRIBED BY THE LEGISLATURE IN 
ENACTING UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (1973, AS AMENDED). 
A. Section 7 6-6-203 does apply to appellant 
because he was "fleeing from a burglary" at the time of 
the aggravating circumstances. 
Appellant argues that he never committed a 
burglary in Miss Ross1 apartment and therefor could not 
have been "fleeing" from a burglary at the time of the 
admitted altercation between himself and Mr. Snyder. 
Whether or not appellant committed burglary was for the 
jury to decide. It is clear from the evidence presented, 
including an eyewitness that saw appellant before, during 
and after the burglary, that a reasonable jury would 
conclude that appellant had committed the burglary. 
Such a reasonable conclusion should not be disturbed on 
appeal. State v. Woolery, 93 Ariz. 76, 378 P.2d 751. 
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Appellant further aruges that his actions 
do not fall within the scope of section 76-6-203 because 
his "flight" had been terminated by Mr. Snyder prior 
to the altercation which aggravated the crime. Such 
an argument assumes a much more confining definition 
of "fleeing" than is justified. No specific guide-
lines are given in the statute as to what circumstances 
might terminate flight from a burglary, but there are 
several factors which would suggest a reasonable inter-
pretation of legislative intent. 
First, the general definition for "flee" or 
"flight" is very broad. For example in Black's Law 
Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition (1968), the definition 
of flight is "the evading of the course of justice by 
voluntarily withdrawing one's self in order to avoid arrest 
or detection. . •" Certainly section 76-6-203 would 
confine flight to a reasonable proximity in time and 
place to the burglary, but any further limitations 
would render this section of the statute ineffective. 
It is therefore illogical to accept the most narrow, 
most literal definition which is suggested by appellant. 
Also, it is clear that if the legislature had 
wanted to be more specific and therefore less inclusive 
of the activity to be proscribed they could and would 
have specifically defined their terms or would have 
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utilized more descriptive language. An example of 
such specificity can be seen in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-302 (1973, as amended) in which the crime 
of aggravated robbery is defined. That statute 
specifies that: 
"An act shall be deemed to be 
'in the course of committing a 
robbery' if it occurs in an attempt 
to commit, during commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after 
the attempt or commission of a 
robbery" (Emphasis added). 
This strongly suggests that section 76-6-203, the statute 
in question, is much more inclusive than suggested by 
appellant since no special adjective is utilized to 
restrict its limits. 
Respondent contends that appellant's alter-
cation with Mr. Snyder did occur while he was "fleeing 
from a burglary" and therefore is proscribed by section 
76-6-203. Although appellant's efforts to leave the 
scene of the burglary were temporarily interrupted by 
a brief submission to Mr. Snyder's strength he was 
still taking actions which constitute "fleeing" 
within the meaning of the statute. With relatively 
little effort and within a short timespan appellant 
secured his total withdrawal from the scene. 
B. Section 76-6-203 does apply to the case 
at bar because the pocket knife used in this case was 
a deadly weapon. 
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According to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601, 
(1973, as amended) 'k deadly or dangerous weapon" means 
i?anything that in the manner of its use or intended use 
is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury." 
Respondent contends that the knife that appellant brandished 
in the case at bar fits within this description. Taking 
notice that the appellant pulled a 4-5 inch bladed knife 
in the midst of a physical bout with three people, when 
tempers were hot and anxiety was very high one can con-
clude that the manner in which appellant used the knife 
was likely to cause serious bodily injury. If the 
Snyders had not noticed the knife as quickly as they did 
and had not backed away from it, it is likely that someone 
would have been severely stabbed during a continuing 
scuffle. 
The statute does not require that serious bodily 
injury or death must result from an instrument before 
it will fall under the statutory definition of "dangerous 
weapon"; it requires only that such result is likely. 
As shown above, such a result was likely in this case. 
Appellant cites Blout v. State, 376 S.W. 2d 
844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) for the proposition that courts 
have refused to characterize knives as dangerous weapons. 
Two points need to be made about this conclusion. First, 
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Blout dealt with a case of assault with intent to murder. 
The court thought the necessary intent for such a crime 
could be established if the weapon used was deadly per 
se or if the wounds inflicted would infere that such 
a weapon had been used. In this case no such intent 
problem exists. 
The weapon utilized in Blout was a 2 1/4 inch 
bladed pen knife which the court refused to find dangerous 
per se. The 4-5 inch bladed knife used by appellant 
does not necessarily need to be deemed dangerous per 
se either, but it certainly became a dangerous weapon 
when the appellant used it in the manner he did. 
C. The injury to Mr. Snyder was sufficient 
to justify the conviction of aggravated burglary. 
Once again a thoughtful look at the appropriate 
statutes demonstrates that appellant's argument is 
without merit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1973/ as amended) 
states, in part, that a person is guilty of aggravated 
burglary if in fleeing from a burglary the actor "causes 
physical injury to any person who is not participating 
in the crime." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(8) (1973, 
as amended) supplements this by defining "bodily injury" 
to mean "physical pain, illness or any impairment of 
physical condition". Appellant broke Mr. Snyder's 
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nose by hitting him in the face during the struggle. 
A broken nose certainly causes physical pain and 
can cause physical impairment. 
Respondent contends that the legislative 
intent was to protect all innocent citizens from any 
physical harm which could be caused by a burglar or 
fleeing burglar. A broken nose incurred while trying 
to subdue a fleeing felon undoubtedly falls within the 
type of injury that the legislature was trying to 
protect against. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF A FAIR 
TRIAL BY THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO GIVE THE PROFERRED 
JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE IN A SELF-
DEFENSE SITUATION. 
Although an appellant is entitled to have his 
theory of the case presented to the jury by way of 
proper instructions, he is not entitled to rewrite 
or misconstrue the law in order that his theory might 
be considered valid. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(2) (c) (1973 as amended) 
states that a: 
". . » person is not justified in 
using force under the circumstances 
specified in paragraph (1) (i.e. 
self defense), if he is attempting 
to commit, committing or fleeing after 
the commission or attempted commission 
of a felony." 
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The intent of this statute could not be more clear; 
those who are participating in felonies have re-
linquished their rights to justifiably defend themselves. 
If they utilize any force while perpetuciting or 
fleeing from such a crime they do so at the risk 
of imposition of additional sanctions. Appellant 
admits that the instructions given in this matter 
"were correct assertions of the law as applied to 
usual cases." (Appellant's brieff p. 12). Respondent 
contends that there is nothing so unusual in the 
present case to require an exception to the law as 
written. 
Even if one concludes that an exception 
should be allowed in this situation, under no cir-
cumstances would appellant have been justified in 
brandishing a 4-5 inch bladed knife. Under section 
76-2-402(1) a person is justified in using force 
which is intended or likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury only if he believes that that force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury 
to himself or a third person. 
As explained in Point I above, the manner in 
which appellant used the knife was likely to cause 
serious bodily injury. Since the force used by Mr. 
Snyder was obviously not sufficient to put appellant 
in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury 
the use of the knife was unjustified and illegal. A 
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is very understandable considering appellant had 
already tried to leave the area. Mr. Snyder did not 
punch the appellant until after appellant had 
struck him (T.50). The use of such force when 
trying to effect an arrest was reasonable and is 
condoned under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-403 (1973 as 
amended). Accepting this conclusion it would follow 
that failure to give the proffered jury instruction 
as to self defense against unreasonable force, even 
if otherwise justified, did not put appellant at a 
substantial disadvantage or lead to an unfair trial 
since unreasonable force was not used against 
appellant. Therefore, such failure should not cause 
a reversal. State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 
P.2d 53. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, respondent respect-
fully requests that the conviction of the lower court 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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